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Comments on Hill:
“Punishment, Conscience, and Moral Worth”
Nelson Potter
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
This is an interesting paper to me, among other reasons, because it deals 
with both halves of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals; that fact alone also makes 
it somewhat unusual. It proposes in particular that there is a kind of anal-
ogy between conscience as an inner voice of morality and punishment as 
a provider of incentives against antisocial actions through punishment as 
deterrence.
As Hill points out, there has been quite a lot of discussion of Kant’s 
views on punishment, but not much about his views of conscience. Nev-
ertheless, there remain scholarly puzzles about Kant’s views on punish-
ment, and there is hope that we can learn something about Kant’s views 
on punishment by drawing out the comparisons with conscience, as well 
as learning more about conscience. Such comparisons help to make clearer 
than ever a fact about Kant’s theory of punishment that I think both Hill 
and I agree on and find worth emphasizing, viz., that Kant’s discussion of 
punishment is not simply a presentation of isolated moral intuitions about 
the deserts of felons, and the appropriate anger we direct toward malefac-
tors. It is rather in a variety of ways embedded within, and very much an 
outcome of Kant’s general theory of morality.
Kant himself has little to say about connections between the two parts of 
Metaphysics of Morals, and yet we have much to learn from teasing out the 
relevant points of comparison. One such connection that is important in 
Hill’s discussion, and that I take to be both important and correct, is that 
we have a (qualified) ethical duty to obey the law. Hill’s account of the 
motivation that a morally good person would have for obeying the law 
is, I think, correct and important, and helps us to bring Recht and Tugend 
into closer relation; this account of how our duty to obey the law works 
can also help us see that punishment is not only a topic in law or external 
duty, but is a legal topic with a moral background.
Let me briefly explore another such connection between the two parts: 
Kant does not say, but I think we must assume, that for an individual to 
be properly subject to punishment, he or she must possess inner freedom. 
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Hence, it is not appropriate to punish cats or machines that malfunction, 
and for a similar rationale it is not appropriate to punish unintentional 
acts or acts that are the product of mental illness, unless there is at least an 
indirect connection with human intention, and hence freedom.
Here is another connection between Recht and Tugend that should be 
of interest: If an individual acts badly, we can fairly reliably infer a bad 
intention. However, we cannot reliably infer good intentions from good 
actions. The act of giving to charity may be done for all sorts of morally 
neutral or even bad motives, and we are not, in general, able to infer good 
motives. But an evil action can hardly flow from a good intention, and 
hence there is a lack of symmetry.
Hence, we can say that if someone performs a punishable act, there is 
also an inner moral evil (intent or attitude) in the one punished. Or, to put 
the point in something like the contrapositive: No one should be subject 
to punishment unless there is an inner moral evil present in that person. 
This would be true even if we take the position that the only appropri-
ate thing to be punished is the external act, rather than the inner intent. 
And we should also be clear that it would be wrong to punish a mere evil 
intent that was never manifested in action. E.g., Gloria has a great hatred 
for her ex-landlord, but she successfully resists the strong impulse to do 
him harm, or even, she never seems to have enough time successfully to 
stalk and shoot him; if her evil intent leads to no overt act, she would not 
be punishable.
Let us ask concerning Kantian autonomy: How can it be compatible with 
autonomy to have one’s behavior forcibly interfered with, as it is when the 
individual is punished, e.g., given a prison sentence? If we speak initially 
in terms of “outer freedom,” we can say that punishment is intended to 
resist wrongful interferences with others’ freedom, which is what punish-
able offenses are. Punishing a bank robber makes clear the state’s position 
that such an action is wrong, and deters the punished person and others 
from performing such acts, thereby preserving a rightful range of freedom 
for external action of banks and depositors. Further, to mention a point 
that Herbert Morris makes in “Persons and Punishment,”1 the punish-
ment system maximizes freedom by not interfering with anyone’s behav-
ior until the individual actually acts wrongly, and violates a law; this was 
one way in which a social system of punishment compares favorably with 
a social system of therapy, in Morris’ view.
So the punishment system, by deterring antisocial acts, preserves exter-
nal freedom. Well, one might reply, it does so only by interfering in a very 
serious way with the autonomy of the person punished. But then Kant 
could reply, that there are two sorts of freedom-lawless, wild freedom, 
which he is not interested in, and freedom as acting in accord with prac-
tical requirements on action, including moral requirements. Punishment 
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is a hindrance to a hindrance of (external) freedom, and is in this system 
consistent with autonomy.
We can imagine a similar kind of dialogue concerning inner freedom. 
Consider an individual’s freedom, which she might forcibly insist upon, 
to drink herself into a drunken stupor. Imagine moral suasion being ap-
plied to such a stupor-prone individual, whether from herself or from oth-
ers. It might be urged that refraining from such indulgences would be 
an interference with personal autonomy, and that moral considerations, 
which would wish to pull one back from such free behavior, even if they 
come from inside oneself, are incompatible with true self-determination. 
A person who is constantly on guard against personal indulgence was de-
scribed in the 60s as “up tight” and the thought was that such an individ-
ual was lacking in a certain important sort of personal freedom. But Kant’s 
reply is that only moral freedom is true freedom, and in this sense such 
self-constraint is an act in favor of personal freedom. Here, it will be no-
ticed, the imagined Kantian replies to complaints that either punishment 
or moral self-constraint would be anti-autonomy, are closely analogous.
Finally, let me consider the question of whether the Kantian conscience 
has a motivational role. Hill seems to want to affirm a motivational role for 
the Kantian conception of conscience. Let me construct an interpretation 
of the Kantian conscience according to which the motivational role would 
continue to be played by the agent’s Willkür (faculty of choice) rather than 
specifically by conscience.
Kant insists that we cannot have an obligation to have a conscience, and 
that we would be just lacking a moral nature if we did not have a conscience 
at all. What is usually being said when we say that someone does not have 
a conscience is that such a person does not listen to her conscience. But 
what the conscience is “ ... is practical reason holding man’s duty before 
him for his acquittal or condemnation in every case that comes under a 
law” (MS, Ak., VI,  400). I read this as saing that conscience itself does not 
motivate; the possibility of being moved by conscience is instead left to 
the agent’s Willkür. The duty that relates to conscience, Kant tells us (Ak. 
VI, 401) is “... to cultivate one’s conscience, to sharpen one’s attentiveness 
to the voice of the inner judge and to use every means to obtain a hearing 
for it ...” Hence, we have only indirect duties with respect to conscience, 
and our direct duties relate to our responsiveness to conscience.
The comparison, then, would be not just between conscience and pun-
ishment, both of which are motivators to moral action. Rather, the fuller 
comparison is between the criminal justice system of laws, including pun-
ishment, and the inner set of faculties of choice that include conscience. 
Conscience is most directly comparable to “law,” for each in its way puts 
before us salient characteristics of action as being morally relevant, espe-
cially in a negative way. So we can get analogous inner conversations: 
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“Driving while drunk is against the law, and that must be a reason for 
thinking it morally wrong as well. That suggests I have a conclusive moral 
reason for refraining.” “My conscience tells me that defrauding my uncle 
out of his inheritance is wrong. I can’t seem to discover the error of that 
way of thinking (i.e., by my conscience), and so what I did must have 
been morally wrong. I should consider whether there is some way to undo 
what I did.” Both law and conscience are moral signposts, signals of sa-
lience, one in the internal realm, one in the external realm.
In the case of the external signpost, the law, we understand the mere 
statement of law to be connected with provisions for criminal punish-
ment, which would move us if no moral consideration did, to refrain from 
breaking the law. The incentive that is specially connected with law is an 
external one, viz., threat of punishment.
In the case of the internal signpost, one’s conscience, we understand the 
judgments about morality that it supplies us with, and we (viz., our fac-
ulty of choice) respond in some good or not so good way. Our Willkür may 
not be listening at all, in which case no response; we may be tuned into the 
message of conscience, in which case we move away from the wrongful 
choice through the self-constraint of moral motivation.
Perhaps a reason why there has not been much discussion of Kant on 
conscience is because by itself, and apart from a moral self that listens to 
and responds to its deliverances, it is an incomplete faculty. Kant insists 
that we cannot have a duty to have a conscience, and that we cannot have 
a direct duty to develop our conscience—either idea leads to an unac-
ceptable regress. Rather, what we develop is our responding system, the 
moral self, the Willkür.
In the case of the institution of punishment, the laws, and the crimi-
nal justice system must both be constructed within the state, and there is 
much more to be said about how this construction is to proceed, though 
not in this comment. Thus, we get Kant’s theory of the state, and of pun-
ishment.
The analogy is between (1) in Recht a mere precept of law and the mo-
tivation that is added to obeying this precept by the provision of pun-
ishment, and (2) in Tugend the precept provided by conscience and the 
motivation provided by Willkür. This way of stating the analogy is sug-
gested by Kant’s remarks in the general introduction to his Metaphysics of 
Morals:
In all lawgiving (whether it prescribes internal or external actions, and 
whether it prescribes them a priori by reason alone or by the choice of an-
other) there are two elements: First, a law, which represents an action that 
is to be done as objectively necessary; and second, an incentive, which con-
nects a ground for determining choice to this action subjectively with the 
representation of the law.2
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Both the institutions of criminal punishment, and even conscience are 
consequences of human imperfection, I think. They both swing into action 
only when there is a prospect of serious wrongdoing. If all individuals 
acted morally perfectly, there would be no criminal violations, and the in-
stitutions of criminal justice would wither away. In fact, it might be urged 
that in a society of morally perfect finite beings, the state would not be 
necessary, and that all we need to move to a satisfying state of anarchism, 
would be for all of us to modify ourselves into morally perfect finite be-
ings. Analogously, such a morally perfect individual would, I think, never 
hear the voice of conscience, and, we might add, a person possessed of 
perfect virtue after the model of Aristotle also might never hear that voice. 
If that is correct, then conscience acquires the importance it has in Kant’s 
moral philosophy because of Kant’s characteristic idea that there is so of-
ten a conflict between duty and inclination.
NOTES
1 Herbert Morris, “Persons and Punishment,” Monist (1968) 52(4): 475-501.
2 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, $3 Ak., VI 218f.
